Cause for concern: “Iran has stepped up production of 20 percent enriched uranium, which is close to weapons grade.” A satellite image of Iran‘s suspected nuclear bunker at Fordo.

A pre-emptive attack on Iran’s nuclear program would be an act of folly – By Mark Fitzpatrick

Ominous developments of late over the Iranian crisis suggest that two worst-case outcomes are both becoming more likely. Iran continues to inch closer to becoming nuclear-armed and the prospect of pre-emptive war may have become more real.

Despite all the means that have been employed against it – sanctions, financial pressure, cyber attacks, sabotage and assassinations – as well as all the incentives that remain on the table, Iran continues to produce low-enriched uranium for which it has no civilian need. If further enriched to weapons grade, Iran’s stockpile is sufficient for up to four implosion bombs.

More alarming is Iran’s increasing production of 20 percent enriched uranium, which is close to weapons usable. Iran is moving the 20 percent enrichment effort to a new plant deep inside a mountain near Fordo, where it has said it would triple production. Because the facility is well protected against conventional attack, the move could be seen in Israel as an action-forcing “point of no return.”

Also worrisome is Iran’s development of second-generation centrifuges that can enrich uranium up to five times faster than the first-generation model that is the mainstay of its enrichment program. The good news is that the newer machines are not yet perfected and that export controls and sanctions appear to have prevented Iran from acquiring the necessary raw materials, such as maraging steel, to produce them in industrial quantities.  

Meanwhile, Iran has made progress on the two other activities necessary for a deliverable weapon. The IAEA’s November 2011 report provided evidence that some aspects of Iran’s weaponization work continued after the 2003 date when the US intelligence community concluded that the structured weaponisation work was suspended.

Iran’s missile program made further advances in 2011, with the third test launch of the solid-fuelled Sajil-2 missile last February. Tehran announced that the rocket flew 1,900 km into the Indian Ocean and also hinted that it had a sea-based tracking capability to monitor the splashdown.

The missile program suffered a setback in November when a key testing center was leveled by explosions that killed the head of program and 16 others. Iran declared it an accident, but post-incident imagery suggested foul play.

An attack on the missile facility would be consistent with what has been called a covert war. An incident early this year, however, crossed what many regarded as an unacceptable line. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton strongly condemned the Jan. 11 killing of Natanz procurement director Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan and denied US responsibility.

For a nuclear program as advanced as Iran’s, a “decapitation strategy” is unlikely to work. In addition to the moral issue, such killings can be counterproductive. Iran announced that 1,300 university students switched to the study of nuclear sciences after the assassination.

Iran also labeled US-led sanctions against its central bank and oil exports an act of war. In contrast to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s dismissal of earlier UN sanctions as a “disposable tissue,” he acknowledged that the current sanctions are hurting. The value of the rial is plunging and Iran’s inflation rate is soaring.

The sanctions are harming traders and consumers most. Government revenues have increased due to uncertainty-fueled oil price rises. However, the impending EU oil embargo and similar steps by other countries in response to US pressure will cut into Iran’s revenue stream.

In response, Iran seeks to show that it can fight back. The threat to close the Strait of Hormuz if an oil embargo is imposed should be interpreted as a warning of how Iran will respond if attacked militarily. Iran would not close off its main export and import route except under circumstances of war.

A pre-emptive attack on Iran’s nuclear program would be an act of folly. US military and intelligence officials firmly oppose such action because of the predictable consequences of the war and questions about an exit strategy.

Among other costs, a war against Iran would unite the Iranian people behind a regime that is otherwise fracturing and destroy reform hopes for a generation. It would incite reprisals against Western-affiliated personnel and interests throughout the region by Iranian-trained groups and sympathizers, drive oil prices skyward, imperil fragile economies worldwide and turn much of the world against America.

Worst, it would spark an all-out Iranian effort to produce nuclear weapons without the constraints of IAEA inspections. Air strikes, which would not remain “surgical” in the ensuing escalation, would thereby hasten the very result they were intended to pre-empt.

As if to quiet the drumbeat of war, engagement efforts appear to have been re-energized. How much to make of this is unclear, however. Iran says it received a letter from the Obama administration seeking direct talks. Iran also claims to be preparing for renewed talks in Istanbul with the EU-led E3+3 (France, Germany and UK plus China, Russia and the US), though the European Union has not received a response to its October letter asking for a clear indication of readiness for sincere talks about its nuclear program without preconditions.

In the two rounds of talks a year ago, Iran refused to meet bilaterally with the US or to discuss a revised version of a confidence-building measure to swap Iranian enriched uranium for research reactor fuel. If talks do ensue, perhaps the economic pressure Iran is feeling will induce it to try another tack.

In September, Ahmadinejad offered to stop enriching to 20 per cent if Iran were provided reactor fuel. There was no reported response. But Russia and Iran were quietly discussing a step-by-step approach to the outstanding questions about Iran’s nuclear program.

Let us hope that the slivers of engagement light are not overwhelmed by the darker clouds on the horizon and that another war in the Middle East is not launched by mistake. Given the absence of any established communication channel between Iranian and American naval forces in the Gulf, a misinterpreted maneuver or a careless mishap could spark conflict.

Miscalculations of another sort could also lead to war. US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta recently made Washington’s red lines public: developing a nuclear weapon or blocking the Hormuz Strait. Israel’s red line is more ambiguous. The Israelis themselves may not know what would cause them to take unilateral military action. The Iranians cannot know either, which could cause them to be either cautious or risky.

Israeli leaders say they cannot accept a nuclear-capable Iran. Yet nuclear weapons capability lies along a continuum – there is no single tripwire. In most regards, Iran already has the capability: centrifuges that can further enrich its low enriched uranium to weapons grade, a corpus of design work related to nuclear explosions, and a fleet of missiles that can carry nuclear warheads if they are made small enough.  

What Iran apparently does not yet have is a political decision to move form capability to production. Enriching above 20 per cent would quickly become known to inspectors, unless carried out at a secret facility, yet Iran to date has proven inept at keeping nuclear facilities secret. Diplomacy has not been played out. If dual-track strategies of incentive and disincentives do not lead to fruitful negotiations, deterrence can still dissuade Iran from taking the final step of actually manufacturing a nuclear weapon.

– Mark Fitzpatrick is Director of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Program at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.