Silvio Berlusconi rides - and partly steers - the crisis of Italian society - By Gian Enrico Rusconi

He has earned his own "ism." "Berlusconism" is more than a charismatic, Machiavellian media tycoon. It is a product of the breakdown of an Italian society willing to hand ever-greater powers to a leader claiming to be acting in its best interest.

The "Berlusconi phenomenon" is a political fact. It can neither be dismissed nor condemned as extravagant, as was possible only a few years ago. It has paved the way for a metamorphosis of Italian democracy.

Today, no political force or party exists in Italy that can act as an alternative to Berlusconi. "Berlusconism" is not just a media populist version of a generally anti-democratic form of politics. It is a variant of democratic life that has to be analyzed in terms of its originality and autonomy.

It is also time to reject the simplified view of Silvio Berlusconi as a media tycoon who came to power thanks to his wealth and influence as owner of half of Italy's television stations, someone who continues to exercise power by pulling the wool over Italians' eyes and distracting attention from his conflicts of interest. Berlusconism matches the ambitions of broad political circles (organized within his alliance) that are already preparing for an era after Berlusconi but at the moment cannot do without him. These political circles want to control and certainly not put an end to what the "Il Cavaliere" has created.

Berlusconism goes hand-in-hand with a radical renewal of the political class, even if many of its representatives originate from traditional political groupings. In fact, it is precisely the former Christian Democrats and the former Socialists who, together with the exponents of the post-Fascist Alleanza Nazionale and the Lega Nord, form the backbone of his government.

Berlusconi's voters do not stem exclusively from the middle and upper classes. They are ordinary people. Anyone today who feels economically and socially disadvantaged - however high up the social ladder he or she may be - turns to Berlusconism, which at least promises a change in the status quo, a loosening of red tape and greater local freedom. And today - in a climate of deep recession - the government pledges to provide positive (naturally without using the politically incorrect word "protectionist") support for ordinary citizens who have fallen upon hard times. Berlusconism is an expression of Italian "civic or civil society" - an expression of many citizens' profound feeling of powerlessness and deep disenchantment with the old politics and the traditional party political system.

It is difficult to judge the programmatic announcements of the Berlusconi government and its "political philosophy" a priori. The political culture of Berlusconism is oriented very generally toward "liberal" values, toward modernization, and when it comes to the issues of bioethics or civil ethics, it looks to strict "Christian values" as defined by the Catholic Church. In the everyday business of politics, however, the only thing that counts is a systematic and head-on confrontation with the left and its culture.

In contrast to the antipolitical image that he cultivated at the beginning of his career, today Il Cavaliere increasingly tends to play the role of "politician and statesman." When Berlusconi first entered the political stage at the beginning of the 1990s, he presented himself polemically as "the new man." He created a personal party of a very new kind (Forza Italia) without bureaucratic structures, with leaders whom he controlled and who were dependent on him. Today, Berlusconi presents himself as the person who has transformed the established party system in Italy and who - strengthened by the support of his coalition partners - is also striving for a transformation of institutional/constitutional structures toward a presidential system.

If you take all this into account, then you have to rethink the concept of "media populism." The thesis that Italy has become a media dictatorship or has restricted critical freedoms is exaggerated. The Berlusconi government undoubtedly monitors public television today in Italy and this fact clearly helps prevent harsh criticism of the government. Yet this is not an exclusively Italian phenomenon. Furthermore, a small minority of public opinion continues to identify with a number of television programs critical of the government.

When you look for an apt term for Berlusconism today, it would be "democratic populism." Let us begin with the term "populo/people," which should be understood here in the sense of "voting public." All elections are ascribed the quality of a constitutional assembly. Slogans like "change" and "innovation" actually denote the abandonment of the traditional understanding of the constitution as a balance of powers and a fundamental agreement among opposing political forces. The only thing that remains "democratic" is the election mechanism, the result of which appears to justify a radically applied "spoils system" (with the winner defining the rules).

The other component of this system is the direct relationship between voters and the "leader," to whom charismatic properties are ascribed. Forza Italia deputies, for example, tend to play the role of representatives of their "leader" (to whom they always explicitly refer from the election campaign onward). Meanwhile, Berlusconi has announced the dissolution of Forza Italia and the creation of a new political grouping - Popolo della Libertà, which is also planned to include the Alleanza Nazionale - a pure election support group for the "leader" and his co-opted supporters.

Compared to the class divisions of traditional society and their party political projections, the social structure of the electorate has broken down. It is no coincidence that Berlusconi never speaks of "social classes," but - rather politically correctly - of "successful/unsuccessful citizens," of the "privileged/underprivileged" and the lower (proletarian) classes consisting of those who have been "held back." A form of social homogeneity arises only in the (supposed) directness of the link between the "leader" and the voter.

Naturally, in presidential systems of government (U.S. or French) there is also a direct relationship between voters and leader, which can occasionally assume populist qualities. In the case of Berlusconi, however, an institutional presidential protective barrier is missing. Berlusconi would like personal charisma to replace the institutional role of the president. In this sense, it is possible to speak of an informal or creeping presidentalism that threatens the existing constitutional order - in the name of the electorate.

Berlusconi is not responsible for the downfall of the old order. He merely brought the restructuring of the traditional political system that began with the "Bribesville" scandal to its conclusion. At the same time, he succeeded in evading the judiciary, which he stigmatized as political, and creating a general climate of mistrust toward the "judicial revolution."

Within a few years he convinced the parliamentary majority to pass a controversial reform of the Italian legal system. Berlusconi encouraged the further polarization of the political system by gathering around himself and Forza Italia (a party entirely tailored to his needs), the Alleanza Nazionale, the Unione dei Democratici Cristiani (the political home of part of the former Christian Democrats) and Lega Nord. The opposition consists of the Center-Left coalition around Romano Prodi.

In total contrast to the assurances of Il Cavaliere that all or almost all of the goals of his previous (2001-2006) government program were achieved, it is impossible to overlook the fact that the promised economic upturn did not take place following market deregulation and tax cuts. All the economic indicators suggest that Italians' everyday lives have become more difficult.

The prime minister does not deny these facts but blames them on external factors, namely the economic paralysis of Europe. He claims that the fault lies with the common European currency and the restrictive measures of the "Brussels bureaucracy." Yet Berlusconi's last and most important trump has been and remains the dread of a national disaster in the event of the electoral success of the center-left parties - of the "communists."

The mutation of the Italian democratic system is the outcome of a variety of factors. Berlusconism in Italy is the symptom not only of a crisis of party political representation, but also of the disenchantment of citizens - in other words, of the entire civil society. "Democratic populism" with the plebiscitary and media-based characteristics described above is one way of answering and replacing the shortcomings in representation and decision-making. The call for stronger decision-making powers for the government is growing louder and louder.

Berlusconi's success depends on whether he meets the expectation that his government can make clear and concise decisions - in contrast to the vacillation of other governments that fell victim to debilitating conflicts of interest. This leads to the latent change towards a presidential form of government that Berlusconi is introducing without institutional reforms. However, this is based upon a political party polarization that currently favors and strengthens Berlusconi's organization and creates difficulties for his opponents.

Against this background, society stands deeply divided, socially split, and largely passive and resigned in spite of a number of dynamic groups. That is why what we are actually looking at is an "Italian question" rather than a "Berlusconi phenomenon."