Israel, Europe and the Mashreq - By Volker Perthes

Let's assume the latest U.S.-sponsored Middle East initiative makes progress, and the Palestinians and Israelis, against all odds, reach a settlement. What then? The EU might hold one of the keys to lasting stability in the region.

There is too much déjà vu to not be skeptical regarding the prospects of the current Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The aim - two states living peacefully side-by-side, the problems - the so-called final status issues, as well as the solutions - the Clinton parameters or the Taba Accord are still the same. It is certainly an irony that President Bush wanted to avoid a hands-on approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and even denied its relevance. He is now, after seven years, trying to broker a deal.

Bush may also be engaging for the wrong reasons. He may see the Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts as part of alliance building against Iran. This would be another misreading of the situation in the Middle East, underestimating both how much local actors, even in Palestine, are driven by their own local agendas and interests, and how relevant a resolution of the Palestinian conflict is for the Arab world, particularly for the Mashreq countries (the Arab countries west of the Mediterranean, north of the Arabian Peninsula and east of Iran) and Saudi Arabia.

There is skepticism, but this should not mean resignation. Certainly, the last seven years have been wasted. This has inflicted enormous damage. But it seems that key policy makers have learned. Ehud Olmert's insight that Jerusalem will eventually have to be divided may not be new. Yet the fact that an Israeli prime minister stated it publicly is important. It could become a confidence-building measure towards the Palestinians if it was not being undermined by new settlement projects in the occupied part of the city. President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salaam Fayad have started serious efforts to establish a monopoly of force in their quasi-state, even though the conditions to do so under occupation are anything but favorable. Even Hamas, at least its governing faction in Gaza, is again talking about a truce and negotiations with Israel. How serious they are will be judged against the willingness of Hamas to stop its rocket attacks. And the Arab states are much more supportive of the peace process than they were at the time of Camp David in 2000. The support of Saudi Arabia is enormously important - both for the Israeli and the Palestinian leadership.

Over the years, it has become clearer that the parties in the conflict never are the ones you wish they were. And while it is easier to act unilaterally, you have to engage those that are available - your enemies - if you want to resolve the conflict. You will even have to help them to become partners.

Of course, success is not guaranteed. Olmert is surviving in a coalition government that remains stable only as long as he does not fulfil Israel's obligations under the Road Map and does not make compromises which he knows are necessary. Abbas and the Palestinian Authority are not even in control of the West Bank, and they are unable to move people and goods from one part of the Palestinian territories to others, or to provide basic public services in the Gaza Strip.

With the key actors so weak, one might ask whether the whole idea of launching new negotiations was not a non-starter. The answer is, of course, yes, the Palestinian leadership and institutions, and the Israeli prime minister, are weak. But one of the most important ways to strengthen the local actors, probably even to keep them afloat, is to engage them in a serious process that improves the situation on the ground and brings a resolution to the conflict closer.

Where is Europe in all this? Undeniably, European involvement in the region has increased over the last few years. This goes for economic aid and political engagement. Just think of the efforts made under the recent German EU presidency to revive the Quartet and to get Syria into the process rather than leaving it outside. Think also of the security field. The EU runs two European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions in Palestine, and there is a strong European participation in UNIFIL, the UN peacekeeping forces in Lebanon (with - quite important for Germany - the first military contribution of the Bundeswehr to peacekeeping in the Arab-Israeli conflict area).

At the same time, Europe's ability to influence events on the ground seems rather limited. Partly this is because the EU is still not always acting like a union in the Middle East, partly it results from the EU itself giving up its leverage over the actors. This is particularly the case in Palestine, where it chose not to talk to elected representatives after the 2006 legislative elections, and by also failing to clearly support the short-lived Palestinian Unity Government of 2007.

The "Quartet Principles," demanding that the Palestinian government refrain from violence, honor agreements, and acknowledge Israel's right to exist, are legitimate, and express what we rightly expect. However, turning them into conditions even to talk is quite unusual, and not what we do with many other states in the region. And the withdrawal of support from pre-state institutions that we actively helped to establish has, without a doubt, contributed to their breakdown.

The EU continues to be the most important donor to the peace process and the Palestinian territories. This has been underlined by the recent Paris donor conference. Europe is also the most important trade partner to all Mashreq countries, it runs important projects in Palestine and other Mashreq countries, and it tries to further regional cooperation through the Barcelona process. At the same time, the recent EU action plan for the Middle East Peace Process, which was initiated by Germany, is strikingly not ambitious (or perhaps realistic). The proposed action focuses on support for Palestinian businesses and universities, and on strengthening the Palestinian police, political parties, and other institutions. Some of the instruments of the EU's toolbox will become more important once we reach the step "beyond peace." I don't think, however, that a diplomatic role can be avoided altogether.

Starting from the instruments at hand in the EU toolbox and the working institutions, we have to ask:

− Can Europe, and how can Europe, use the network of relationships with the Mashreq countries to catalyze regional and sub-regional cooperation in the economic, political, educational, and security fields? This is not only necessary to support the peace process, but even more so to strengthen a peace, which, if achieved, will probably lack societal support and be fragile for some time to come.

− Can Europe develop its European Neighborhood Policy so as to give Israel, which still is the economically and politically closest partner of Europe in the Middle East, a prospect beyond its association agreement? Probably by allowing participation in some EU institutions such as the European Economic Space - like Norway and Switzerland? The idea, of course, cannot be to integrate Israel into Europe and thereby isolate it from its Middle Eastern neighborhood. We will therefore also have to make Arab states - Palestine, Syria and others - fit not only for trade, but also for competition with Israel.

− Will Europe be able to carry peace negotiations forward over a transition period in the U.S., if no final deal is struck at the end of the Bush presidency, or if a basic agreement needs further deliberations over details? Can Europe jump in without letting the U.S. escape its responsibilities?

− Can Europe assume a monitoring and management support role in the implementation phase of an agreement? And will it be able to take the fire, if that also implies to become tough with parties who fail to live up to their commitments?

− Will Europe be able to become a catalyst of talks between Syria and Israel, and possibly between Syria and Lebanon?

− Finally, will Europe be able to bring moderate Islamists not only into negotiations, but eventually also into the institutions supporting peace?

I am convinced that by constructively using our strong political and societal links with Israel, and by opening channels to Arab societies, we will also increase Europe's own "soft" power in the region.

- Volker Perthes is director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. This text is an excerpt from a speech at the Zeit Foundation in Hamburg.