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HALF-THROTTLE

Into the future with one foot in the past:
Why so many eastern Germans feel at odds
with the West thirty years after reunification

IN THIS ISSUE

In 1990, the US and USSR supported German reunification, but for different reasons. Today, Brussels and Berlin are butting heads with Washington and Moscow, again for different reasons. Michael Thumann sorts out the EU's trouble with Russia while Juliane Schäuble examines how the world could improve with a President Joe Biden

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When the GDR went bust in 1989, Chancellor Kohl promised "blossoming meadows." While much has improved, the country has not really grown together, and East Germans are now asking: Why should we even want to become like the West? Martin Machowecz, Sabine Rennefan, Wolfgang Engler and Stephan Kaufmann explore the eastern mindset

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There is still more to lay bare about the somewhat awkward German habit of stripping down in public; read Irish-born Killian Lannister's "exposé" in our series on *Zee Germans*

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Our special section *The Berlin Times* features the decades-long drama of the capital city's attempt to build an airport. Hannes Koch gives an overview from 30,000 feet while Lorenz Maroldt lands a few zingers.

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Forging ahead

A call for European leadership in times of turmoil

BY THEO SOMMER

No one looking back on the past decade can do so with satisfaction, let alone complacency. The world has become unstable. The international order created after World War II is breaking down; the global institutions established as part of that order are frail and ineffective. The COVID-19 pandemic has turned previously existing fault lines into frontlines. Troubles are piling up everywhere. In many places, cooperation is morphing into confrontation. US-China tensions have become the main axis of global politics; the rivalry between the two great powers will dominate the near future, regardless who is in the White House next January.

The European Union will have to adjust to the shifting geopolitical dispensation. No longer can it bank on the United States to provide global guidance and military protection. And it has to recognize that China, its primary economic partner, has grown into an assertive, some would say, aggressive challenger aspiring to world leadership.

Several states are testing Europe's unity: China with Xi Jinping's Silk Road Initiative and the "17+1" cooperation scheme in Eastern Europe and the Balkans; Russia with Vladimir Putin's assault on Ukraine and his attempt

to destabilize the Brussels community – a target shared by US President Donald Trump; and Turkey with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's neo-Ottoman imperialism.

At the same time, the Europeans see a plethora of threats and crises coming ever closer. The Syrian civil war has swept millions of refugees west. Rising tensions over Ankara's predatory hunt for undersea oil and gas in the Mediterranean conjure up the dire specter of a war between the two NATO members Turkey and Greece.

Europe can no longer bank on the United States to provide global guidance and military protection

Another flash point touching Europe's interest is Libya, riven by internal conflict, in which the UN-recognized government in Tripoli is supported by Turkey, while Russian mercenaries assist General Khalifa Haftar's regime in the east. French President Emmanuel Macron is trying to protect Total's oil interest in the desert country. He is also pushing the Lebanese toward meaningful reforms of their collapsed political system.

Together with 1,100 German soldiers, central African forces and 15,000 UN Blue Helmets, 5,000 French troops are battling in Mali against Islamist terrorism. The recent coup – at the hands of Malian forces trained by the French and Germans – sent ripples across the Sahel and beyond.

In the Far East, China's onslaught on the freedoms of Hong Kong and its saber rattling over Taiwan could, like Washington's elevation of the People's Republic to an adversarial rogue state,

set off an explosion in the South China Sea – a waterway of utmost importance to EU commerce.

Nearer to home, the fraudulent elections in Belarus triggered a popular uprising against the callous tyranny of Alexander Lukashenko. Its violent suppression by OMON police and the possibility that Russian troops might join the crackdown confronted the EU with another sticky problem, this one at its very border.

Given the darkening horizons, it is hardly surprising that calls for making Europe capable of global politics, *weltpolitikfähig* in German, have been raised ever more insistently. Ursula von der Leyen, before assuming the presidency of the European Commission, put it quite bluntly: "Soft power alone won't suffice today if we Europeans want to assert ourselves in the world. Europe must also learn the language of power."

Macron chimed in: "We must use the grammar of today, a grammar of the language of sovereignty"; he wants to "revive Europe as a political and strategic power." Many others agree that only in a united Europe can our several nations be strong.

Learning the language of power, von der Leyen explained, "for one thing means building up our muscles, where hitherto we were able to rely on others, for example in security policy. Furthermore, it means using the existing power more purposefully where European interests are concerned."

What has become of all these striking statements? Regrettably, they have not moved beyond mere sound bites.

Optimists speak of Europe's geopolitical awakening in the course of the COVID-19 pandemic. Europe is stirring, they say, recalling Jean Monet's dictum: "Europe will be forged in crises." In the EU's €750 billion (\$885 bil-

lion) economic recovery program, they see a "Hamiltonian moment" – a point in history when joint debt policy becomes the first chapter of a federal playbook. The deal allows the EU to borrow, tax and spend like an actual state.

It is indeed an important innovation enabling a strong economic convalescence and a more prosperous future. It does not, however, spell more unity among the 27 member states in foreign and security policy. The much touted strategic autonomy of the European Union remains hobbled by widely varying national stances on most foreign issues. There is no agreement on how to deal with Russia, China, Turkey, Africa or even the US. And the principle of unanimity regularly prevents joint action.

As long as the unanimity rule prevails and any small state can veto collective action, Europe will not be taken seriously in global politics. To be respected, it must speak with one voice – as it does in trade politics.

Josep Borrell, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, is not alone in calling for the abandonment of the unanimity principle and the introduction of qualified majority voting. "It would be better," he argues, "to adopt a strong and substantial position by a majority rather

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BY GEMMA PÖRZGEN

Éminence grise

Putin has not yet chosen a course vis-à-vis Belarus, but all signs point to his continued support for Lukashenko

After the disputed presidential election in Belarus on Aug. 9, Vladimir Putin was one of the first to congratulate Alexander Lukashenko on his landslide win. Yet the Russian president was cautious at first, pursuing more of a wait-and-see approach as to which position the Kremlin should take.

"Putin congratulated Lukashenko on his victory, but the tone of his remarks was cool and formal," noted the Moscow-based sociologist Lev Gudkov. Even Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, chair of the right-wing nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, spoke of "election fraud," and Aleksey Pushkov, chair of the

Duma Foreign Affairs Committee, called it a lost election rather than a victory. Coverage of the protests in Belarus was surprisingly fair and was even debated in Russian state media.

Leaders in Moscow were most certainly surprised that the anti-Lukashenko protests continued peacefully for weeks rather than coming to a quick conclusion. Even as the nation's security forces used violence in a ruthless attempt to quell the protests, the demonstrations spread across the

entire country. Results included strikes at large state-operated companies and a genuinely popular people's movement against Lukashenko.

This clearly made an impression in Moscow, too, especially since the protests involved no anti-Russian sentiments, in contrast to the situation in Ukraine during the Maidan Uprising of 2014. Indeed, the Belarus opposition took great pains to ensure that the protest did not assume an anti-Russian character.

And yet Lukashenko remains in place as head of state in Belarus. He seems to be waiting out the protests while wearing them down through violent actions by the police. It seems that he can continue to count on the support of his security forces. His centralized power apparatus is showing no tangible cracks, and only a few high-ranking functionaries have withdrawn their allegiance.

Moscow is keeping a close eye on the situation. "Having Lukashenko remain in power is

the best option for Putin," argues the Belarusian political scientist Yauheni Preiherman from the Minsk Dialogue Council on International Relations. He is convinced that "Putin is the kingmaker of the Belarusian political crisis."

Russia's president appears to be keeping all of his options open. While Lukashenko refuses to take any phone calls from European politicians such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron, Putin has picked up the phone and signaled his readiness for dialogue. Among the solutions being considered are talks within the framework of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and a constitutional process in Belarus.

At the same time, however, Putin also announced in late August that he had organized a standby security force that could intervene in Belarus if the situation got out of control. Most experts nevertheless consider military intervention by Moscow to be highly unlikely. For the Kremlin, such a move would involve an incalculable risk of triggering a wave of anti-Russian resentment in Belarus. An invasion would not be welcome.

The foreign policy damage would also be significant and further isolate the Russian leadership on the international stage. Furthermore, an invasion of Belarus wouldn't earn Putin any points among his own people.

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In contrast to the annexation of Crimea in 2014 – a move that was supported by a majority of people in Russia – surveys conducted by the Moscow-based Levada Center showed that only 13 percent of respondents were in favor of incorporating Belarus. “Most of the people surveyed think the relationship with Belarus should stay the way it is.”

The threat of a Russian invasion is presumably being used more as a diversionary tactic in Moscow’s effort to stabilize Lukashenko in less obvious ways and thereby further increase his dependence on the Kremlin. If successful, this approach would make the existing union between Belarus and Russia much stronger – a relationship that has so far been more of an administrative agreement than an actual union of states. In the past several years, Lukashenko has pursued a seesaw policy of resisting Moscow’s insistence on closer ties between the two states while intermittently offering his services to the EU. But now that Lukashenko has been discredited as an election fraudster, the only thing he has left to secure his political survival is his close relationship to Russia.

In this regard, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin’s visit to Minsk on Sept. 3 was instructive. The official reason for the visit was to discuss the billions of rubles of debt owed to Russia by Belarus and to conclude an agreement about energy supplies. In the context of Mishustin’s visit, Lukashenko shuffled around a number of high-level security officials.

Ivan Tertel was named the new head of the Belarusian secret service (KGB), replacing Valery Vakulchik. London-based political scientist Mark Galeotti sees Vakulchik’s repeated resistance to interference by Moscow as the reason for his ousting. Galeotti also argues that the switch at the top spot of the secret service was carried out under pressure from Moscow, noting that Tertel likely has a better relationship to the Russian secret service (FSB).

These moves are an indication that the Kremlin is committed to strengthening cooperation on different levels. On one level, Moscow supports Lukashenko’s power apparatus by deploying Russian “consultants” at various key contact points. The impact of this tactic is already felt in Belarusian media; after a number of journalists and technicians were fired, Russian colleagues took over their duties. In the meantime, these “Russian aides” have no doubt been installed in many other fields. Most recently, after hosting Lukashenko for talks at his residence in Sochi on Sept. 14, Putin made an announcement pledging a loan of \$1.5 billion to Belarus in response to Lukashenko’s plea that “a friend is in trouble, and I say that sincerely.” Whether Russian aid remains purely monetary is an open question.

The situation in Belarus can change on a daily basis and the country’s future is difficult to predict. If the peaceful protests were to suddenly turn violent, a change in Moscow’s cautious policy is quite possible. People in Minsk are highly concerned that paid provocateurs might actually instigate such a turn of events in the near future.

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Backroom bravado

As both big-tent German parties gear up for the post-Merkel era, the candidate carousel is in full swing

BY LUTZ LICHTENBERGER

Her era will have to come to an end eventually. Angela Merkel has been German chancellor since 2005; you would have to look long and hard to find another politician holding a country’s top political position for so long, autocracies and banana republics excluded. But Merkel has unequivocally stated she will not run for office again in fall 2021, one year from now, in the Bundestag elections.

Her announcement in late 2018 and her subsequent resignation as chair of her party, the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), during a time when her approval ratings were on a precipitous downturn, did not make her a proverbial lame duck; it brought her a confined yet unequivocal new lease on power. In fact, it gave Merkel room to operate free of the common ills that often face democratic politicians with an overly cautious eye on reelection. She no longer has to try to please every constituency. A physicist by training, Merkel’s rather uncharismatic, somber, almost scientific style of governing, allowing her to dissect a problem with surgical accuracy, has served her best. Big ideas, sweeping visions and grand oratory are not her cup of tea.

Merkel’s largely deft handling of the COVID-19 pandemic – both the death rate and the economic downturn have been limited compared to other states in the European Union and overseas – has boosted her party’s poll numbers

Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer was the early front runner. The 58-year-old had been serving as minister president of the small southwestern state of Saarland until Merkel tapped her to become the CDU’s general secretary, an influential post often doubling as stepping-stone to higher office. When Merkel resigned from her party post one year later, AKK, as she is often called, narrowly won the intra-party contest, besting two candidates who explicitly wanted to change Merkel’s course, both symbolically and in terms of policy.

The biggest question in German political circles is who will be tapped by Merkel’s party to be its candidate for chancellor

AKK won by adhering to Merkel’s legacy while carefully staking out her own political territory. And yet, due to sinking approval ratings, rhetorical missteps and regional electoral losses, a frustrated Kramp-Karrenbauer stepped down in February just before the pandemic claimed all headlines and attention.

The party’s poll numbers immediately went back up due to the German version of the “rally ‘round the flag” effect that typically rewards the party in power

quent foreign policy expert, more respected than admired, have all thrown their hats into the ring.

On March 1, Laschet would have been a better’s best choice; he had government experience, enjoyed broad appeal with his folksy and joyful demeanor and was the right man to cross every aisle.

But over the summer, his erratic and wavering handling of the pandemic – seen as too lenient, too eager to “reopen” – shone a different light on the leader. Fairly or not, he is now considered rather unsteady, indecisive and a bit of a panderer to the COVID-19-denying crowd.

Enter Markus Söder. The minister president of Bavaria, Germany’s second-biggest state, and head of the CDU’s sister-party, the Christian Social Union, has long been defined as the opposite of Laschet: too ambitious, calculating, combative.

In early 2018, Söder, for all intents and purposes, succeeded in forcing out his predecessor, Horst Seehofer. It was the culmination of a years-long bare-knuckles intramural struggle that eventually got him his self-proclaimed dream post,

to take vocal credit for all he had done. Söder quickly became the Andrew Cuomo to Laschet’s Ron DeSantis, the governors of New York and Florida whose pandemic policies were a study in contrast.

It did not take long for speculations to surface in Berlin as to whether Söder was priming for a joint nomination by the CDU and the CSU for the chancellorship in 2021.

Laschet could eke out a win in the race for the leadership of the Christian Democrats against Merz and Röttgen – with their once-promising runs now mere afterthoughts – and still not get the nomination at the party’s convention in December. Söder still has to declare his candidacy. Most likely he will delay his declaration for as long as possible while gauging his chances. As is befitting the era of the pandemic we are living through, all bets are off concerning the future.

The Social Democrats (SPD), the coalition partner of the CDU/CSU, has had its own turbulent leadership rumblings.

After its first female party chair, Andrea Nahles, resigned in anger over intra-party bickering in June 2019, the SPD held its first-ever election for the party’s top post in which all party members, not just several hundred delegates, were eligible; it was more akin to a US-style primary.

Candidates were encouraged to run on two-person tickets each comprising a woman and a man. In a surprise outcome in the final round, Saskia Esken and Norbert Walter-Borjans defeated Klara Geywitz and Olaf Scholz. Scholz,

However, a little more than half a year later, on Aug. 10, the party empire struck back. The SPD’s all-powerful steering committee, having already nixed a premature end to the coalition, was especially dissatisfied with Esken’s unorthodox and loose style, and in a truly topsy-turvy move nominated Scholz, the loser of the primary, to stand as the candidate for chancellor next fall. Esken and Walter-Borjans had to publicly approve what has to be considered an all-out repudiation of their political viability.

Current polling suggests that the Social Democrats will receive 16 percent of the vote. Scholz would have to beat out the Greens, currently polling one to two points ahead, for second place and then hope to form a coalition with them and the Left Party. It is a narrow path to victory.

The CDU and CSU, currently at 37 percent, will most likely court the Greens to form an unprecedented partnership.

The eco-friendly Greens have moved closer to the center, positioning the party as the sensible choice for traditional bleeding-heart liberals and the affluent cosmopolitan latte-drinking progressives. The leadership duo of Annalena Baerbock and Robert Habeck project just enough surface charisma to brush over the unresolved policy conflicts that come with being open for both a center-right and a center-left coalition. The Greens are in an enviable position, as both the Union and the SPD desperately



Close pre-Corona, rivals now: Armin Laschet (left) and Markus Söder

to as high as 40 percent, a level not seen since 2013, when she won reelection in a landslide.

The biggest question in political circles these days is who will be tapped by her party to be its candidate for chancellor – and to have a very good chance of becoming Merkel’s successor in office.

The CDU has already begun its version of what the US calls the “invisible primary,” whereby candidates sort out their chances in backrooms (that is, when it was still permitted to meet face-to-face in enclosed spaces), garner support among important regional party officials, position themselves with sensible policy proposals and present themselves as either Merkel loyalists or purveyors of new ideas.

in a time of crisis – that is, when the party is actually reacting to said crisis in an adequate and competent manner.

Even more than in previous years, the race for the party chairmanship is being considered a preliminary selection of the next chancellor. While it is common that the party chair secures his or her nomination for the general election, there is no automatic mechanism guaranteeing it – as recent events have shown.

Armin Laschet, minister president of Germany’s most populous state, North Rhine-Westphalia, Friedrich Merz, a long-time aspirant for the chancellery who’s been biding his time and harboring his grudges since being outmaneuvered by Merkel 20 years ago, and Norbert Röttgen, the elo-

Half a year later, Söder narrowly won reelection in Bavaria, not an outright rebuke of his claim to power, but a warning shot. Söder changed several of his right-leaning stances, got on better terms with Merkel, with whom he had often clashed, took on environmental and social issues, and refrained from dressing up in a colorful comic costume for Carnival, an old habit he now considered unbecoming for a statesman of his bearings.

When the virus struck in March, Söder pushed ahead in his newfound role. Restrictions were harsher in Bavaria; Söder was often the first to implement them, thereby forcing his colleagues’ hand in other states to follow his lead – and never forgetting

minister of finance and vice chancellor in Merkel’s cabinet, is seen as being uncharismatic yet experienced, competent and reliable – the quintessential establishment candidate.

Esken, on the other hand, was a left-leaning, largely unknown backbencher in the Bundestag. She had chosen as her running mate the 70-year old Walter-Borjans, who only barely had a bigger national profile. Their headline-grabbing selling point was the stated goal of ending the grand coalition with the Christian Democrats. The mood in the party had become more leftist in late 2019, and Esken’s and Walter-Borjan’s often young supporters were considerably more adept at turning out the vote, thus securing their victory.

want to end the grand coalition that has governed Germany for 13 of the past 17 years. And after nearly joining the government in 2013 and 2017, they won’t pass up the chance this time.

And yet, the establishment forces in both big-tent parties know they must steel themselves for the possibility that a continuation of their grand coalition may prove the best move forward at this time next year. Merkel’s patented moderating style just might come in handy for her successor.

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